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Justice without Soiidarity? Coiiective Identity and the Fate o f the "Ethical" in Habermas' Recent Political
Theory.

Throughout his career, Habermas has insisted that solidarity is the "reverse side" of justice, insofar
as abstract, individualistic principles of justice arise out of concrete, intersubjectively shared forms of life,
a process that is described and defended in his conception of discourse ethicsT Thus a defensible
conception of justice cannot focus solely on individual rights and duties. It must simultaneously seek to
protect the shared forms of life that give rise to those rights and duties, as well as the individuals to which
they apply. In this way, Habermas has understood justice and solidarity, morality and "ethical life" (Hegel's
Sittlichkeit), as necessarily complementary.

Yet in his current work, Habermas has come to reject this claim. In a recent address to the World
Congress of Philosophy, Habermas claimed that he "no longer uphold[s] the assertion that 'justice
conceived deontologically requires solidarity as its reverse side' because it leads to a moralization and de
politicization of the concept of solidarity."^ Initially, this may seem to be a curious claim, since much of
that address is dedicated to defending the idea of solidarity in the context of current challenges to cross
national European unity. But the kind of solidarity that Habermas has in mind there is a purely political
solidarity, less demanding, he presumes, than the deeper sort of solidarity that he once saw as a necessary
complement to any defensible conception of justice.

This development in Habermas' thought is foreshadowed in earlier work, where he distinguishes
between a stronger "ethical-cultural" identity, and a weaker "ethical-political" identity, and argues that
only the latter, rooted in what he calls a "constitutional patriotism," is necessary to provide the
justificatory foundation of a democratic system of law.^ One could thus read his more recent work on
cosmopolitanism and the "constitutionalization" of international law as an attempt to expand and build
upon this weaker kind of collective identity, such that its justificatory scope would extend beyond the
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nation state, to international bodies like the European Union. But this expansion arguably stretches the
idea of a purely political solidarity to its breaking point. If the citizens of multicultural states have little
more in common than the constitutional structure of their shared political landscape, how fragile must be
the grounds for broadly shared identification across newly formed juridical bodies that encompass both
cultures and nations? It is one thing to point to a long-established and well-respected constitutional
tradition as the ground of solidarity among otherwise diverse members of an existing state. It is another
to rely on this kind of solidarity in cases of nascent or not-yet-existing constitutional structures.

Habermas is aware of this difficulty, yet he seems to have become skeptical of the power of
secular morality to produce the kind of deeper solidarity that global justice demands, a pessimism that
has led him, in recent years, to a reevaluation of religious traditions as a means of "bridging the gap"
between diverse cultural and identity groups, and filling the supposed void in secular traditions.^ In what
follows, 1will argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that the turn to religion is unnecessary. The
forms of solidarity Habermas finds lacking in the contemporary secular world are observable in various
political movements, from feminism to black liberation. Contrary to common criticisms that see in these
identity-based movements a challenge to broader social solidarity, I will argue that they actually represent
models of solidarity at least as readily generalizable or "translatable" as those found in religious traditions.
A careful analysis of these movements further demonstrates that the idea of a purely political solidarity and the corresponding distinction between political and pre-political communities - is untenable, and
thus that Habermas' recent rejection of the "reverse side" argument is unwarranted. Ultimately, I suggest
that the stronger notion of solidarity that Habermas seeks in religious traditions, and that I argue can be
found in sociopolitical movements, points to a kind of humanism that represents a common ground of
both.

1. Solidarity as the "Reverse Side" of Justice
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To begin, it is important to have a working understanding of the idea that Habermas now claims
to reject - the idea that solidarity is the "reverse side" of Justice. In the WCP address in which he rejects
that view, as quoted above, Habermas refers to a 1984 article in a volume discussing Lawrence Kohlberg's
model of moral development.^ In particular, he is discussing Carol Gilligan's well-known critique of
Kohiberg, in which she suggests that his model neglects gynocentric relations of care, and Kohlberg's
response, in which he argues that care/benevolence is implicit in his stages of moral development. This is
where Habermas makes the claim that he refers to in the address:

From the perspective of communication theory there emerges ... a close connection between concern
for the welfare of one's fellow man and interest in the general welfare: the identity of the group is
reproduced through intact relationships of mutual recognition. Thus the perspective complementing
that of equal treatment of individuals is not benevolence, but solidarity. This principle is rooted in the
realization that each person must take responsibility for the other because as consociates all must have
an interest in the integrity of their shared life context in the same way. Justice conceived deontologically
requires solidarity as its reverse side.®

He continues:

It is a question not so much of two moments that supplement each other as of two aspects of the same
thing. Every autonomous morality has to serve two purposes at once: it brings to bear the inviolability
of socialized individuals by requiring equal treatment and thereby equal respect for the dignity of each
one; and it protects intersubjective relationships of mutual recognition requiring solidarity of individual
members of a community, in which they have been socialized. Justice concerns the equal freedoms of
unique and self-determining individuals, while solidarity concerns the welfare of consociates who are
intimately linked in an intersubjectively shared form of life - and thus also to the maintenance of the
integrity of this form of life itself. Moral norms cannot protect one without the other.^
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It is significant that this passage occurs within a discussion of Kohiberg's work. Setting aside the
controversies over the precise boundaries of his stages, their gender neutrality, and their culmination in
"stage 6" development, what Kohiberg empirically confirmed was that the development of the "moral
point of view" is preceded by and depends upon concrete interactions with specific others, beginning in
the family and radiating outward with increasing generality. In the Hegelian terms that Habermas
borrows, "morality" - the set of norms that are universally valid for all humans regardless of circumstance
- presupposes and grows out of "ethics" - the particular responsibilities that obtain between members
of a pre-existing collectivity ( a family, a culture, etc.), responsibilities that are based upon reciprocal
relations of concern - that is, solidarity.

Of course, this vision of humans as social, community-bound beings has deep philosophical roots,
going back at least to Hegel if not Aristotle, and it found new popularity in the communitarian and
multicultural discourses of the late twentieth century. But what is perhaps the distinctive contribution of
Habermas' discourse ethic is to reconcile this communitarian premise with a deontological theory of
justice and universal human rights, precisely the target of many communitarian and Hegelian thinkers.
Indeed, the discourse ethic is essentially an attempt to reconstruct the Kantian Categorical Imperative in
a way that acknowledges the intersubjective, linguistic bases of normativity, and thus address the most
important aspects of Hegei's critique of Kant. Roughly, this meant replacing Kant's "monological"
procedure of testing one's individual maxims with a discursive procedure which finds norms valid only
insofar as they "could meet with the consent of all affected in their role as participants in a practical
discourse."® In this way, the task of abstract moral justification becomes grounded in the concrete
lifeworlds ("intersubjectively shared forms of life") of communities of language users. Moral norms no
longer appear as the manifestation of an ahistorical pure practical reason (nor of a historical "absolute
spirit"), but as the product of real communities of discourse. Habermas emphasizes this point in a way
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that reminds the reader of the distinctiveness of a critical theory of society - its grounding in not just
philosophical, but historical and social-scientific understanding as well:

To be sure, the gradual embodiment of moral principles in concrete forms of life is not something that
can safely be left to Hegel's absolute spirit. Rather, it is chiefly a function of collective efforts and
sacrifices made by sociopolitical movements. Philosophy would do well to avoid haughtily dismissing
these movements and the larger historical dimension from which they spring."®

This is an important insight, one which I think is directly relevant to Habermas' ongoing concerns about
solidarity. But before expanding upon this point, let us strive for a fuller view of the justice/solidarity
relation. This relation can be thought of as twofold. Morality/justice overlaps with ethics/solidarity on the
front end, so to speak, insofar as it is the social integration of persons into shared forms of life that make
them capable of moral reflection in the first place. This is the complementarity that is illustrated by
Kohiberg's insights into moral development. But the two also overlap on the back end, insofar as the moral
norms justified in discourse remain impotent unless they are integrated into the concrete contexts of
particular lifeworlds. Habermas refers to the latter stage as a process of application, and insists that this
is distinct from the task of justification, which transcends the particular circumstances of the participants
in discourse. This is why he says that "any universal morality is dependent upon a form of life that meets
it halfway."^° It is also perhaps the key to understanding why he characterizes discourse ethics as
illuminating a "hidden link between justice and the common good."^^

It would be easy to overemphasize this link, collapsing the distinction between morality and
ethics, and thus reading Habermas in a communitarian or neo-Aristotelean way (especially given his
characterization of justice and solidarity as "two aspects of the same thing.") Such a reading might also
explain Habermas' concern about the "moralization" of his previous understanding of solidarity. But this
reading is overly simplistic. In reality, Habermas has always emphasized that the distinction between
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morality and ethical life must not be collapsed, in spite of their various links, areas of overlap, and mutual
dependencies. Further complicating matters, Habermas has always appreciated that the application of
discursively justified moral norms requires political action within a democratic institutional framework.
Indeed, in the very same essay Habermas points to as representative of his abandoned view, he writes
that "justice conceived in postconventional terms can converge with solidarity as its reverse side only
when solidarity has been transformed in the light of the idea of a general discursive will formation."^^ In
other words, only after its link to a particular form of life or "ethical" worldview has been weakened, if
not severed. (As the reader will see, this "politicized" conception of solidarity is central to the
development of Habermas' theory of democracy and law in Between Facts and Norms, in which it forms
the basis of a synthesis of liberal and republican views of sovereignty.)

So what is the real basis for Habermas' rejection of this view? Let us turn here to the WCP address
itself, along with a few other sources to which he himself directs us. This address, like much of Habermas'
recent work, continues to struggle with the empirical reality of European unification, a project in which
he sees significant promise, despite the serious "democratic deficits" from which it currently suffers. In
this context, the issue of solidarity manifests concretely in demands that some EU nations sacrifice in
order to provide (mostly financial) assistance to others. A German scholar addressing the question of
solidarity in Athens only brings this context into greater relief.

Most explicitly, Habermas is addressing a set of criticisms which identifies in pleas for this kind of
European solidarity a kind of soft-hearted idealism - a "moral stuffiness" rife with "misplaced good
intentions."^^ On the surface, this seems to be the motivation for distinguishing solidarity from both moral
and legal norms. The goal of moral and legal norms, he says, is to secure justice, which consists in "equal
freedoms" and "equal respect" for all. As in earlier work, Habermas distinguishes these justice-based
norms from "ethical" norms, which presuppose a "predictable reciprocity" based upon an "antecedently
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existing community." In other words, they are not universally binding, but depend upon more or less
voluntary relationships of trust and reciprocity. (To use the language of contemporary moral theory, these
are supererogatory norms.) Unlike in earlier work however, Habermas goes on to distinguish solidarity
from ethics as well. While solidarity, like ethical life, depends upon relations of reciprocity, it "cannot rely
on pre-political communities such as the family but only on political associations or shared political
interests." This is more than a mere distinction between different forms of solidarity. Habermas goes on
to say that "solidarity is always political solidarity." And yet, suggestive of his earlier conception, he also
claims that this kind of solidarity continues to involve "an interest in the integrity of a shared form of life."
What are we to make of these two claims? The form of life Habermas has in mind is the peculiar
form of a democratic citizenry. He distinguishes this "artificial," "legally organized" form of life from
"quasi-natural" lifeworlds that have "evolved organically." He further characterizes political solidarity as
"forward-looking," and even "offensive," constituting, in an Arendtian moment, a community through
intentional political action. Presumably this makes "pre-political" forms of life backward-looking, in that
they draw upon pre-existing traditions and shared values. Yet taking seriously the claim that all solidarity
is political raises interesting questions about these latter forms of life. For surely not every form of social
reciprocity results in or depends upon a legal apparatus for its maintenance. Is solidarity simply the wrong
concept then for understanding the relations among, for example, members of a cultural minority, an
ethnic enclave, or an oppressed social group? Or are these groups in fact "political" as well, their internal
relations constituting a key part of the larger democratic community? And what of solidarity across
dissimilar political landscapes, for example, with persons living under repressive, non-democratic
regimes? This would seem to be an especially pressing question for a form of solidarity that strives to be
international in scope.
I argue that the distinction between "political" and "pre-political/ethical" lifeworlds is untenable.
Political communities inevitably contain substantive "ethical" aspects, and these aspects form the basis
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of a shared collective identity (though such an identity can be stronger or weaker). On the other hand,
"ethical life" inevitably becomes politicized in a variety of ways, not only in the struggles for recognition
and inclusion typical of existing, unjust societies, but even in ideally functioning democratic contexts.
Ironically then, it is Habermas who is depoliticizing these forms of life, falling prey to idealized notions of
social groups, and thereby failing to fully heed his own warning regarding the empirical understanding of
sociopolitical movements. In reality, the forms of life that populate the contemporary world, from small,
culturally homogenous minorities to large, diffuse ethnic and racial groups bound together more by
historical accident than a consciously shared worldview, cannot be neatly divided into "political" and "prepolitical" communities. And as feminists like Susan Okin have demonstrated, even the family, often
considered the paradigm of "pre-political" reciprocity, must be understood as thoroughly political.^^ The
indefensibility of this distinction then, motivates a qualified defense of Habermas' idea that solidarity is
the reverse side of Justice, against his own recent rejection of this idea.
Before turning to this argument however, I would like to identify another crucial dimension of
Habermas' rejection of the "reverse side" argument, one which lies beneath the concerns about the
viability of the European Union that motivated his WCP address. This other dimension is evidenced by the
fact that the same footnote that announces that rejection points to a volume on religion, which has
become another recurring theme in Habermas' recent work. As it turns out, Habermas' doubts about the
"reverse side" argument are closely linked to another change of heart, regarding the potential of secular
reason to effectively address the various crises present in contemporary life. In An Awareness of What is
Missing, Habermas raises doubts about this potential, asserting in uncharacteristically poetic language
that practical reason alone "no longer has sufficient strength to awaken, and to keep awake, in the minds
of secular subjects, an awareness of the violations of solidarity throughout the world, an awareness of
what is missing, of what cries out to heaven."^^ This newfound skepticism about secular reason is directly
related to the rejection of the link between morality and ethics. "Secular morality," he claims, "is not
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inherently embedded in communal practices."^® Religion, on the other hand, "preserves an essential
connection to the ongoing practice of life within a community and, in the case of the major world religions,
to the observances of united global communities of all the faithful."^^ To be clear, Habermas insists that
he is not referring to the more familiar problem of moral motivation, as it arises, for example, in objections
to Kantian moral philosophy. What Habermas is rather concerned with is what he calls a "political
deficiency" - an inability to translate individual moral agency into collective action for political change.^®
Religion, he thinks, has the potential to bridge this gap "through the shared faith in the promise of a
'redemptive' or 'liberating' justice."^ Thus the link between justice and solidarity survives, but oniy,
apparently, in religiously oriented communities. Of course, the redemptive promise of religion extends
only as far as the community of believers who accept it on faith, and Habermas is not advocating an
evangelical attempt to literally universalize any of these communities. But he does believe that we must
find a way to "translate" the "semantic potential" of religious faith into secular terms.
Notice that this view depends upon the mutual exclusion of morality and "communal practices,"
precisely the link that Habermas previously affirmed. If this distinction holds, then there is nothing special
about religious as opposed to other "ethical" forms of life, i wiil argue that this is in fact the case, as
evidenced by the fact that social movements grounded in particular lifeworlds and "communal practices"
have effected and continue to effect political change. However, I do think that Habermas' desire to
translate the redeeming potential of religion into secular discourses tells us something interesting about
the ultimate goal of his political philosophy, and about the foundations of philosophies of liberation more
generally. I will return to this point in the last section.
The argument that I will now pursue, defending Habermas against Habermas, as it were,
represents an alternative to this "religious turn," one which takes seriously Habermas' admonition not to
neglect the study and history of empirical sociopolitical movements. To that end, I will illustrate the
problems with distinguishing between "political" and "pre-political" communities using two examples of
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these movements. One, the "feminist politics of equality," is drawn in part from Habermas' own work.
The other, the politics of black racial solidarity, sheds light upon an important aspect of contemporary
political life about which Habermas and other contemporary critical theorists have been mostly silent.
Both illustrate the ways in which groups engaged in so-called "identity politics" can translate the
"semantic potential" generated in their own internal discourses into collective action in the interests of
justice. In this way, I will attempt to redeem the thesis that justice is the "reverse side" of solidarity.
Understanding this process however, requires a brief excursus into Habermas' legal and political theory,
which set the stage for a politicized conception of solidarity.

2. Ethics, Politics, and Social Movements

Thus far I have discussed Habermas' conception of solidarity primarily in relation to his discourse
ethic, which is fundamentally a theory of morality. But as I have already intimated, this theory from the
very beginning held significant potential for understanding the normativity of democratic political
practice, and for the justification of legal, as well as moral norms, a project undertaken primarily in
Between Facts and Norms. Here too, the connection between justice and solidarity is revealed, albeit in
somewhat different terms. Habermas is concerned in this period with the ways that discursively produced
norms can be taken up and institutionalized in democratic structures and practices. The "proceduralist"
paradigm of law he develops to capture this process is a synthesis of classical liberal and republican views.
It draws from liberalism the task of delineating a set of individual rights that are understood as constraints
on any possible system of law. Yet it resembles republicanism insofar as these same rights are understood
as the product of a discursive practice - persons acting in concert, bound together by a shared identity as
citizens. It is this latter feature of his theory that specifies the earlier idea of solidarity "transformed in the
light of the idea of a general discursive will formation." In the absence of the metaphysical presuppositions
of natural law, the "private autonomy" circumscribed by a set of pre-political individual rights presupposes
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the "public autonomy" of citizens acting together, in a certain kind of solidarity. Habermas thus refers to
public and private autonomy as "equiprimordial."^° Put another way, this proceduralist paradigm
identifies an "internal relation" between democracy and the rule of law. In either formulation, the
connection between justice and solidarity remains in force, insofar the universalism of a theory of rights
is viewed as grounded in a particular, shared form of life, albeit of a unique and precise kind, in which
those rights are "actualized".
As I have already mentioned, the unique form of life that Habermas has in mind is the shared lifeworld
of a democratic citizenry. Yet as in the WCP address, Habermas is wary of characterizing this form of life
as "ethical" without qualification. "To the extent to which the shaping of citizens' political opinion and will
is oriented to the idea of actualizing rights," he says, "it cannot, as the communitarians suggest, be
equated with a process by which citizens reach agreement about their ethical political understanding."^^
Still, he continues:
But the process of actualizing rights is indeed embedded in contexts that require such discourses as
an important component of politics - discussions about a shared conception of the good and a desired
form of life that is acknowledged to be authentic. In such discussions the participants clarify the way
they want to understand themselves as citizens of a specific republic, as inhabitants of a specific
region, as heirs to a specific culture...and so on...Because ethical-political decisions are an unavoidable
part of politics, and because their legal regulation expresses the collective identity of a nation of
citizens, they can spark cultural battles in which disrespected minorities struggle against an insensitive
majority culture. What sets off the battles is not the ethical neutrality of the legal order but rather the
fact that every legal community and every democratic process fo r actualizing basic rights is inevitably
permeated by ethicsP
This remarkable passage demonstrates precisely why the strict separation between "ethical" and
"political" lifeworlds is misguided. Any actually existing citizenry is going to be bound together to some
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degree by shared "ethical" values - ideas, for example, about what it is to be European, about the meaning
of a shared history, about the values that are embedded in constitutional traditions, and so on. The key
for contemporary multicultural and otherwise diverse societies is to recognize that this is a "thin" kind of
collective identity that can (and even must) incorporate a wide variety of "thicker" forms of collective
identity - various religious and cultural traditions, for example. Habermas recognizes as much in his
conception of "constitutional patriotism," which he characterizes as a form of collective identity "rooted
in an interpretation of constitutional principles from the perspective of the nation's historical
experience."^^ As such, he attributes to constitutional patriotism the ability to integrate citizens politically
without demanding broader cultural assimilation. And yet again he insists that this form of political
solidarity remains "permeated by ethics."^'' Thus the difference between this weaker "political" form of
solidarity and collective identification and a more robust "ethical" or "cultural" lifeworld seems to be a
difference in degree rather than kind.
As one can see then, the idea that justice and ethics are linked together by solidary communities
of discourse is deeply embedded not only in the earlier discourse ethics, but also in the more recent
reflections on the discursive foundations of law and democracy. Thus Habermas' rejection of this view
must be understood as a much more profound shift in his thinking than the brief reflections he has offered
in recent addresses might suggest. Regardless of his current thinking however, it seems to me that his
arguments here are sound.
In addition to the ways in which national (and perhaps even postnational) identities are inherently
"permeated by ethics," it is equally important to recognize the ways in which sub-national, "ethical"
communities are inherently political. Habermas already notes one way in which ethical discourses of "self
clarification" can become political: when "disrespected minorities struggle against an insensitive
dominant culture." But there are various ways in which groups can contribute to the democratic self
understanding of a nation, not all of which correspond to a strongly shared ethical or cultural worldview.
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One example that Habermas consistently uses to illustrate the process by which discourses of what he
calls "self clarification" can become political is the "feminist politics of equality."
This example is interesting precisely because women do not share a strong "ethical" worldview
or a given set of values, even within particular nations. Yet there is a sense in which feminism (especially
in its second wave manifestation) does essentially involve a discourse of "self-clarification" of what it
means to be recognized and respected as a woman. This discourse is crucial, Habermas thinks, because it
represents a necessary intervention in a larger discourse about the meaning of equality. Early feminisms
fought for formal legal equality, especially as manifested in universal suffrage. But while this was a
necessary step on the way to full equality, it quickly became obvious that it was not sufficient. As
Habermas recognizes, "the formal equality that was partially achieved merely made more obvious the
ways in which women were /n/o ct treated unequally."^^ Cultural and material barriers to e q u a lity-th e
feminization of poverty, deep seeded cultural misogyny, and so on - continued to prevent women from
achieving full social recognition. Thus second wave feminism turned to addressing the social and cultural,
in addition to the legal bases of equality. Habermas thus understands feminism as entailing a "dialectic of
legal and factual equality," that illustrates the inherent link between public and private autonomy. A strict
focus on formal legal equality - the right to vote, for example - aims to secure public autonomy at the
expense of private autonomy. It legally mandates equal rights while ignoring the private barriers to
exercising such rights: lack of education, financial instability, poor health, and so on. On the other hand, a
strict focus on material equality - through social welfare programs, for example - aims to secure private
autonomy at the expense of public autonomy. In aiming to secure the material bases for the effective
exercise of formal rights, the social welfare state paternalistically transforms the active, participatory
citizen role into a passive, consuming client role. It can thus disempower the very groups it means to
enable.^® This dilemma is only overcome - equal rights only "actualized" - when the affected parties
themselves engage in discourses meant to clarify their own needs and the way that those needs can be
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most effectively met.^^ This is where the distinction between "public" and "private" breaks down, and
where discourses of self-clarification take on a political character that points beyond the boundaries of
the group. As such, it is a clear example of the way in which both public and private autonomy are
embedded within actual discursive practices, as Habermas' "proceduralist" paradigm maintains.
Discourses like this play a key role in the larger project of forging a shared democratic political
identity (presuming that constitutional patriotism would have to include as basic the recognition of gender
equality). But that is not the only sense in which they are political. Discourses that attempt to forge a
collective identity based not on a pre-existing cultural identity, but primarily on the contingent historical
fact of a group's oppression can also be seen as political in Habermas' sense, regardless of whether or not
they are oriented toward influencing a broader national (or postnational) political identity. They are
"forward-looking," and they conceive of solidarity as the product rather than the precondition of their
collective action. This distinguishes them from cultural and national minorities, who do tend have a strong,
preexisting "ethical" worldview. In previous work, I have referred to the former kinds of identities as
"ascriptive," and the latter as "intentional."^® Feminism provides one example of a political movement
based upon ascriptive identification. The politics of black liberation, to which 1will now turn, provides
another.
Contemporary race theory has convincingly shown that racial identity lacks any kind of "organic"
or "natural" unity. This is the essence of the widely accepted idea that race is a "social construction." The
history of specific racial categories corroborates this idea, and none more clearly than the history of
"blackness." In the European racial discourses from which this category was born, "blackness" ascribed
an essential sameness to a whole continent of people, ignoring massive cultural, linguistic, physical, and
other differences, in the name of a pseudo-biology that would turn out to be false.^® With the transAtlantic slave trade however, this assumption of commonality became something of a self-fulfilling
prophesy, when diverse groups of Africans were forced from their homelands and cultures, and thrust
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into a situation in which they would need to forge a common identity - at the very least a common
language-in order to survive. Thus this historical contingency-the brute fact of slavery and its aftermath
- gave birth over time to a rich and distinctive black culture with its own values, traditions, and practices.
But it is a culture that is fundamentally different from the harmonious "ethical" lifeworlds that Habermas
envisions as distinct from "political" forms of solidarity. It is a culture, and a form of solidarity, that is
political through and through.
Not all would agree of course. Afrocentrics and others understand black culture as being as broad
and deep as any other cultural identity despite its unique historical origins, and often insist upon a
corresponding moral obligation for blacks to identify with and contribute to this shared cultural identity,
which it sees as inherently valuable. And yet the diversity of the black experience today calls into question
this supposedly common culture and the duty to develop it. This discourse of "self clarification" of what
it means to be black raises precisely the same issues that arise in Habermas' reflections on solidarity, and
sheds interesting light on those reflections.
In particular, Tommie Shelby's book We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations o f Black
Solidarity provides a philosophical analysis of solidarity focused on race, addressing directly the question
of a "political" solidarity, and in the process illuminating a woeful blind spot in contemporary critical
theory. Shelby seeks to identify a "form of political solidarity that would subordinate questions of who
blacks are as a people to questions about the ways in which they have been and continue to be unfairly
treated."^® That is, he seeks a form of solidarity that does not presuppose or require any strong collective
identification among blacks, but that is based solely on a common political task - overcoming racial
oppression. In this way, he argues that black racial solidarity is a crucial part of "the effort to
reconceptualize the sociopolitical order so as to make explicit what would be necessary to bring blacks
and other subordinated racial groups into the body politics on terms of equality, reciprocity, and mutual
respect," regardless of the fact that it cannot rely upon pre-existing "ethical" ties.^^
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This analysis of a political solidarity distinct from strong ethical ties is strikingly similar to the kind
of solidarity Habermas aims to enumerate in the WCP address. And it is clearly and explicitly conceived as
a means to achieving justice (the integration of blacks in terms of "equality, reciprocity, and mutual
respect"). And yet as in Habermas' earlier analyses, the "ethical permeation" of political discourses
becomes apparent here too. It is true that Shelby's account of solidarity avoids relying on a "thick" notion
of shared identity, emphasizing instead a common experience of racial oppression. But this experience
itself gives rise to a strong form of solidarity that he characterizes as a "special bond," involving "shared
values and goals," and "mutual trust." This "robust" form of solidarity "entails normative constraints" that
must be "strong enough to move people to collective action, not just mutual sympathy born of recognition
of commonality or a mere sense of belonging."^^ In Habermasian language then, the experience of
oppression constitutes a lifeworld, upon which blacks can (and arguably even must) draw in their struggle
for social justice. Here then, is another concrete example of solidarity as the "reverse side" of justice.
And yet, to repeat once more, black political solidarity is less a case of a politicization of a pre
existing "ethical" form of life than it is the "ethicization," for lack of a better word, of a pre-existing political
reality - the reality of group oppression. This is precisely the same dynamic that is at play in feminism, in
which solidarity among women comes about as a result of the political reality of women's oppression.
Whatever one might say about the successes and failures of these movements, it is clear enough
historically that they do not suffer from a lack of motivation, nor an inability to translate individual
motivation into collective action. Indeed, one of the most common criticisms of these and other forms of
"identity politics" involve the claim that their in-group loyalties are too strong, and undermine wider inter
group alliances and more general concerns for social justice. Criticisms ofthis sort are misplaced however.
For one, identity-based movements have achieved results that are not only beneficial to particular groups,
but to all citizens, in the interests of justice.^^ And perhaps more importantly, given the vast internal
differences within such broad social categories as 'women' and 'blacks,' the achievement of internal

16

solidarity, far from undermining broader social solidarity, actually provides a model for it. Such a response
demonstrates that movements like these possess precisely the potential that Habermas claims that
secular forms of life have come to lack. It is in that sense that I believe that careful attention to these
movements, as Axel Honneth, for example, has demonstrated in a formal way in his analysis of "struggles
for recognition," can be understood as an alternative to the turn toward religion that Habermas seems to
have undertaken.^'* It follows that the pursuit of justice could be achieved by attempting to "translate"
the solidarity present among oppressed groups into a broader solidarity, a possibility that would repudiate
Habermas' skepticism about secular forms of reasoning and action. Still, as the following and final section
will make clear, this approach is not necessarily exclusive of Habermas' "postsecular" strategy, insofar as
it is precisely the possibility of an ethically-based, universal solidarity that Habermas finds appealing about
religion.

3. Emancipation, Reiigion, and Humanism: Concluding Reflections

While the idea of transforming oppressed group solidarity into a broader inter-group solidarity
seems to me a more promising strategy than the idea of "translating" religious potentials, it certainly
presents its own challenges. Indeed, it would be hard to claim that racial and ethnic tensions today are
any less pronounced or persistent than the ongoing religious tensions that might invite skepticism about
the universalizing potential of religion. Racial tensions in particular run deep within the American context
that forms the background of Shelby's analysis. But in the European context as well, racial and ethnic
tensions boil below the surface of current debates about unification and economic progress, tensions
which Habermas' analysis largely ignores. Alas, what follows is not a blueprint for inter-racial and inter
ethnic solidarity. But I would nonetheless like to put forth the provocative view that whatever else such
solidarity requires, a renewed and truly inclusive notion of what it means to be human - a rehabilitation,
in effect, of a kind of humanism - is among its requirements. I cannot fully defend this claim here, but I
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would like at least to point out, by way of a conclusion, that Habermas' hopes for religion as well as my
alternative focus on actualiy existing social movements are not entirely out of sync, insofar as they both
point toward the retrieval of this sort of humanism, one that could provide a minimalist foundation for
the kind of solidarity necessary for global justice.
Humanism has a long and complex history, of course, both within the tradition of critical theory
and more generally. The Frankfurt School is often understood as retrieving the humanistic elements of
Marxism, against the strictly "scientific" historical materialism of more orthodox Marxists. However,
critical theory's relationship with humanism, and Marxist humanism in particular, is significantly more
complex. While early critical theorists like Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch, and Eric Fromm were unabashedly
humanist, the increasing incorporation of psychoanalytic methods, especially in the work of Horkheimer
and Adorno, resulted in their distancing themselves from the assumptions of unproblematic autonomy
and self-knowledge characteristic of humanism, as Martin Jay, the foremost historian of the Frankfurt
School shows.^^ But, as Jay also recognizes, their rejection of humanism also corresponded to an
increasing pessimism about the very possibility of human emancipation. Without delving into the
subtleties of the Frankfurt School's reception, critique, and transformation of humanist thought then, one
can at least see that the question is closely linked to the question raised in Habermas' recent w o rk -th e
question of whether collective human activity is presently capable of effecting meaningful transformation
in the interest of Justice. Like his predecessors, one could understand Habermas' newfound pessimism
about the transformational potential of secular reason in light of his rejection of the possibility of solidarity
simply on the basis of a shared humanity. If Habermas is understood in this way, then maintaining hope
in the transformative potential of communicative rationality might, conversely, be thought to require as
its complement a broad, humanistically grounded conception of solidarity.
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As I have shown above, the apparent skepticism about the possibility of this sort of solidarity
present in Habermas' WCP address runs counter to much of his earlier work. It is in this earlier work that
Habermas' humanistic orientation is most apparent, from his early attempts to argue, contra positivism,
that scientific knowledge is "intertwined with the objective, self-formative process of the human species"
to the development of his theory of communicative action with its basis in a universal pragmatics of
language.^® Moreover, throughout the various stages of his development, his consistent defense of
Enlightenment values against their poststructuralist, postmodernist, and posthumanist detractors is
perhaps the most reliable evidence of the humanistic foundations of his thinking.^’ It is not surprising then
that, despite the ambivalence of earlier critical theorists regarding humanism, Habermas is often
interpreted as returning to (or more accurately, reconstructing) the humanistic normative core of critical
theory.^® I would now like to briefly make the case that this humanistic core remains fundamental to
Habermas' work, evident primarily (though not exclusively) in his writings on religion. That is, I will
demonstrate that the possibility of strong solidarity, which he has increasingly sought in "postsecular"
sources, is grounded in humanistic assumptions, specifically, in a kind of philosophical anthropology he
refers to as a "species ethic."
Habermas' recent reflections on religion seem to have been prompted by at least two major
developments. On the one hand, the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the global conflicts which
resulted made clear that linear narratives of "secularization" were deeply flawed. On the other, Habermas
is troubled by the emergence of genetic manipulation and other biotechnologies that "could change the
self-understanding of the species in so fundamental a way that the attack on modern conceptions of law
and morality might at the same time affect the inalienable normative foundations of social integration."®®
In response to the latter, Habermas considers the possibility of "moralizing" human nature by way of "the
assertion of an ethical self-understanding of the species."^® This "species ethic" would identify (or perhaps
construct) the boundaries of that form of life that is specifically human, that which "concern[sj not culture.
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which is different everywhere, but the vision different cultures have of 'man' who - in his anthropological
universality - is everywhere the same."^^ This is not meant to deny the vast diversity of human cultures,
but rather to emphasize that such diversity is grounded in, even made possible by, a common humanity.
The volume that succinctly presents this line of argument, appropriately entitled The Future of
Human Nature, ends with some cursory reflections on "faith and knowledge," inaugurating a theme that
Habermas has now spent over a decade wrestling with.^^ It is perhaps unsurprising that these humanistic
reflections lead him to a reevaluation of religious traditions, as humanism is deeply indebted to various
religious traditions, for example, in the idea that humans are created imago Dei, in the image of God, and
as a result have an inherent worth and dignity.'^^ Indeed, the idea of a species ethic is remarkably similar
to (perhaps a secular "translation" of) the kind of "universalistic communitarianism" that Habermas
identifies as the feature of religious worldviews that make them promising sources of solidarity.''^ In spite
of common understandings and contemporary uses of the term that assume an oppositional relationship
between humanism and religious traditions then, it is clear that Habermas sees no such necessary conflict.
The attraction and attention to religious traditions, for him, can in large part be attributed to their
humanistic orientation, and the possibilities of solidarity that this entails.
Habermas' reflections on a species ethic and its connection to religious traditions also provides
yet another challenge to the strict separation of "pre-political" ethics and political morality. For if
normative reflection can or must ultimately be grounded in our shared humanity in order to be
motivating, then justificatory discourses of various kinds (moral, legal, and discourses of "self
clarification") need not be completely divorced from this weak "ethical" assumption in order to achieve
universality. A common humanity might be enough to generate and motivate general moral obligations.
I cannot pursue this point here, but others have developed plausible interpretations along these lines.'’®
What I would like to do is demonstrate that the humanistic task of demarcating a common humanity as a
foundation for political praxis is also shared by the sociopolitical movements that I have examined above.

To this end, I must briefly consider the critique of humanism in more general terms, beyond its specific
manifestation in the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory.
The main critique of historical humanism can perhaps be summed up in Charles Mills' quip that
"European humanism usually meant that only Europeans were human.'"*® Ironically, in circumscribing the
boundaries of the human, humanism inherently runs the risk of dehumanization - the ultimate exclusion
of that which falls outside of those circumscribed boundaries. And even when traditional European
humanism did extend the boundaries of the human beyond the European, it was rarely on terms of
equality. Herder's 18^® century humanism, for instance, insisted on the common humanity of all the
world's peoples, against the grain of the emerging racialism of his time. However, his search for "new
specimens of humanity" among Jews, Africans, Americans, and other non-European groups implied their
inferiority, as if to insist upon a counterintuitive point by exclaiming "even these are humans." As Hannah
Arendt writes, his strategy was to conceive of these groups "as more alien, and hence more exotic, than
they actually were, so that the demonstration of humanity as universal principle might be more
effective."^^ The alternative to dehumanization then, appears here as the fetishism of "exotic" human
groups. This has lead some to reject the project of humanism altogether. And yet, many others have
responded to the exclusions and exoticisms characteristic of European humanism by insisting upon the
humanity of the excluded, and/or reconstructing the terms of their recognition. This sort of revisionist
humanism was and is often pursued by the marginalized and excluded themselves, demonstrating that
the propagation of humanism is not (and probably never was) an exclusively European project.
In Africa, for example, humanism was a primary driving force in the 20*® century struggles for
decolonization and independence. African leaders and intellectuals like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere,
and Kenneth Kaunda drew upon a humanist tradition rooted in traditional African values as a foundation
for national and Pan-Africanist solidarity, as well as for a distinctly African socialism. Among those
traditional African values, egalitarianism figured centrally. Nkrumah, for instance, asserts that "any
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meaningful humanism must begin from egalitarianism" and that the goal of African socialism should be
"to reconsider African society in such a manner that the humanism of traditional African life re-asserts
itself."^® Nyerere's conception of ujamaa is similarly grounded, giving central place to egalitarianism, and
rejecting the centrality of conflict characteristic of European Marxism in favor of a broad, humanistic
solidarity.'*® And Kaunda's Zambian Humanism, like Nkrumah and Nyerere but more explicitly, elevated
humanism to the level of official national ideology, also emphasizing egalitarianism, non-exploitation, and
solidarity, and incorporating principles of Christianity in their interpretation.®® These theorists and
movements challenge the idea of humanism as a dehumanizing colonialist ideology.
Across the Atlantic, abolitionists like Frederick Douglass were motivated by humanist ideals
similar to those espoused a century later by African intellectuals. Douglass, an immanent critic but
ultimate believer in Enlightenment liberalism, sought to expand its principles to encompass all human
groups. The historian Waldo E. Martin thus claims that "the guiding assumption unifying Douglass'
thought was an inveterate belief in a universal and egalitarian brand of humanism."®^ This brand of
humanism would be incredibly influential upon the mainstream Civil Rights Movement, pursued by
humanist leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. But it was not only philosophical liberals like Douglass and
King who espoused humanist ideals. Black radicals like C.L.R. James developed their own brand of Marxist
humanism (though James would have considered the phrase redundant®^) emphasizing the spontaneity
of human political activity, against the rigid assumptions of the orthodox "scientific" Marxism dominant
at the time. In this respect, his version of Marxism shares certain affinities with early critical theorists that
are only recently beginning to be recognized and developed.®® Like his later African counterparts and his
earlier American predecessors, James attempted to come to terms with the exclusionary nature of
European humanism without abandoning its central tenets. According to Brian Alleyne, he "sought to
articulate a vision of history that encompassed all of humanity, whilst remaining aware of the
contradictory and often exclusionary ways in which humanism and universalism have developed."®^
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No doubt there were countercurrents and anti-humanist trends within African and AfricanAmerican political discourse. As with the Frankfurt School, and probably to an even greater degree, the
black radical tradition has had a complex relationship with humanism. But the above examples show that
it is simplistic and false to paint a picture of a debate between European humanism and non-European
resistance to its colonialist assumptions. Humanism is deeply rooted in anti-colonial, anti-racist, and anti
capitalist discourses, as much as it is rooted in the European Enlightenment. And contrary to some
interpretations that understand humanism as synonymous with secularism, it is also rooted in various
religious traditions; in many cases, the religious and radical influences have become inseparable, for
example, in the interpretations of Christianity that undergird some versions of African socialism and
African-American abolitionism. This demonstrates that, though religious traditions may not be the sole
wellspring of solidarity, neither are they necessarily opposed to the sociopolitical movements that I have
identified as an alternative to Habermas' turn toward religion.
My point then, in concluding with these necessarily limited reflections on humanism, is to identify
a common denominator of the religious traditions Habermas has turned to as repositories of solidarity,
and the sociopolitical movements that I argue Habermas has come to overlook, against his own earlier
advice. Though I have raised doubts about whether religious traditions have an exclusive claim on the kind
of solidarity sorely needed today, these traditions may well contain sources of solidarity similar to those
that I have argued are identifiable in contemporary movements like feminism and black liberation. Both
often rely on a conception of what it means to be human, and both point to the folly of abandoning the
"reverse side" argument, which recognizes the centrality of solidarity to any actionable conception of
justice. If the idea of a global democratic community cooperating on terms of justice is not hopelessly
utopian, it seems to me that it must be founded on some basic notion of humanity: of what it means to
be human, and perhaps why democracy (in the broadest sense) is crucial to achieving that humanity. This
would not preclude the existence and flourishing of a diverse array of cultures and other forms of life. To
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the contrary, it is a necessary condition for their flourishing, if not their very existence. If Habermas truly
has abandoned such a project, then his abandonment represents a dramatic shift away from a theme that
has been at the core of his work for most of his career. It also represents a serious mistake, one that
contemporary critical theorists and others interested in human emancipation, global justice, or even
regional stability would do well not to follow Habermas in making.
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